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SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION*
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG**

While most of education reform in the early twenty-first century is
focused on trying to find ways to make high-poverty schools
effective, a more promising strategy seeks to integrate schools by
socioeconomic status. Given the overwhelming evidence that it is
very difficult to make high-poverty schools work well on a
systemwide basis, about forty U.S. school districts are seeking to
break up concentrations of school poverty by using the
socioeconomic status of students as a factor in student assignment.
The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, if amended, could
facilitate greater economic school integration by allowing children
in failing high-poverty urban schools to attend higher-performing
middle class suburban schools. In addition, the legal principle that
states must provide "adequate" education to students should be
extended to require that pupils receive access not only to adequate
levels of school expenditures, but also to other important school
"resources" that have a powerful effect on academic achievementpositive peer influences, active parents, and high-quality teachers.
Because these resources are not normally found in high-poverty
schools, an adequateeducation requires giving all students access to
good, economically mixed public schools.
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INTRODUCTION

What is to be done about the manifold problems associated with
"high-poverty"' elementary and secondary schools? Fundamentally,
there are two basic strategies available: improve them or abolish
them. We can accept economic school segregation as a fact of life and
do our best to try to make "separate but equal" work-as most of
modern education reform does-or we can seek to integrate school
populations by socioeconomic status, significantly reducing the
number of high-poverty schools and allowing many more children to

1. High-poverty schools are defined here as those with more than 50% of students
eligible for free and reduced-price lunch. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL
TOGETHER Now:

CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL

CHOICE 106-12 (2001). Students are eligible for subsidized lunches if their families make

less than 185% of the poverty line. Child Nutrition Programs-Income Eligibility
Guidelines, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,161, 13,161-62 (Mar. 18, 2005). In the 2005-06 school year, a
student from a family of four making less than $35,798 was eligible for subsidized lunch.
Id. at 13,162.
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attend high-quality, mixed-income public schools. This Article argues
for the latter strategy.
Part I of this Article outlines the empirical evidence that suggests
high-poverty schools are very difficult to fix in a systemic fashion.
This portion of the Article also outlines the reasons why such schools
present difficult learning environments, analyzing the effects of peers,
parents, and teachers on schools.
Part II surveys voluntary efforts by school districts to break up
concentrations of school poverty and improve student achievement
by socioeconomic integration. This Part next reviews the legal and
educational advantages that socioeconomic integration offers
compared with voluntary efforts to integrate students by race. This
Part also examines the new provisions available under the Federal No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB") 2 to pursue socioeconomic
integration. It concludes with a discussion of how housing policy
could promote socioeconomic integration in schools.
Part III examines legal strategies for pursuing socioeconomic
school integration. This Part reviews existing legal efforts to promote
socioeconomic integration in Connecticut, New York, and Minnesota,
and outlines a legal theory under which plaintiffs in other states could
argue that the remedies required under many state constitutional
provisions for an "adequate" 3 education should be extended beyond
school financing to require affirmative steps to break up
concentrations of school poverty. This Part ends with a discussion of
how state precedents in housing law might lend support for
socioeconomic school integration.
I. HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS ARE VERY HARD To "Fix"

Researchers have consistently found that schools with high
concentrations of poverty present, on average, a very difficult
environment for student learning.4 While isolated high-poverty
schools with charismatic principals and especially dedicated teachers
have proved to be successful, the overwhelming majority of highpoverty schools struggle. Although some studies from groups across
the political spectrum purport to find large numbers of successful

2. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. II 2002)).
3. Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84
N.C. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006) (explaining the significance of the word "adequate" in
education litigation).
4. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
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high-poverty schools,5 most of these "successes" turn out to be
unreplicable or to be flukes: most schools identified as "high flying"
are unable to sustain high levels of achievement over time and at
multiple grade levels. According to a recent study conducted at
Florida State University by Douglas N. Harris, high-poverty schools
are twenty-two times less likely than middle class schools to be
consistently high performing.6

Of course, low-income schools are less likely to perform well, in
part, because individual low-income students come from families that

have less access to health care, adequate nutrition, a quiet place to
work, and the like.7 However, a separate problem arises when lowincome students are concentrated in schools separately from their
middle class peers. The legendary "Coleman report" of the 1960s

found that after the influence of the family, the socioeconomic status
of a school is the single most important determinant of a student's
academic success.8 This basic finding of the report-that all children
do better in middle class schools-has been affirmed again and again
in social science literature.9 In 2005, for example, University of

California professor Russell Rumberger and his colleague Gregory J.
Palardy found that a school's socioeconomic status had as much

5. See, e.g., SAMUEL CASEY CARTER, No EXCUSES:

LESSONS FROM 21 HIGH-

PERFORMING, HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS (2000) (detailing the successful practices of
twenty-one principals of low-income schools); CRAIG D. JERALD, DISPELLING THE MYTH
REVISITED:

PRELIMINARY

FINDINGS FROM A NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS

OF "HIGH

FLYING" SCHOOLS 6-7 (2001), available at http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/
A56988EB-28DE-4876-934A-EE63E20BACEE/0/DTMreport.pdf (reporting data that
thousands of high-poverty and high-minority schools are also high-performing schools).
6.

DOUGLAS

INEQUALITY:

N.

HARRIS,

ENDING

THE

BLAME

GAME

ON

EDUCATIONAL

A STUDY OF "HIGH FLYING" SCHOOLS AND NCLB 20 tbl.2 (2006),

available at http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/documents/EPSL-0603-120-EPRU.pdf. In the study,
"high-poverty" is defined as having at least 50% of students eligible for free and reducedprice lunch. Id. at 18. "High-performing" is defined as being in the top third in the state
in two subjects in two grades and over a two-year period. Id. at 18, 20 tbl.2.
7.
8.

RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS 37-47 (2004).
JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,

EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 325 (1966).

Coleman's comprehensive

report used a sample of more than 150,000 students to study educational opportunity in
the United States. A recent reanalysis of Coleman's data by Geoffrey D. Borman of the
University of Wisconsin at Madison found the effects of attending a high-poverty or
predominantly minority school were even greater than Coleman found. See Debra
Viadero, Fresh Look at Coleman Data Yields Different Conclusions,EDUC. WK., June 21,
2006, at 21.
9. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 25-35 (2001) (citing numerous studies finding
that a school's socioeconomic status is second only to family background as a determinant
of students' academic successes).
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impact on the achievement growth of high school students as a
student's individual economic status.'"
Low-income students do not typically perform as well
academically as middle class children, with one striking exception:
low-income students attending middle class schools perform better,
on average, than middle class students in high-poverty schools.
Scores from the 2005 National Assessment of Educational Progress
("NAEP") among fourth-graders in math indicate that low-income
students in more affluent schools score eight points higher on
average-more than half a grade level-than middle class students in
schools with between 75% and 100% of students eligible for free and
reduced-price lunch."
Why is it advantageous for students to avoid concentrations of
poverty? Virtually everything that educators talk about as being
desirable in a school-high standards, good teachers, active parents,
adequate resources, a safe and orderly environment, and a stable
student and teacher population-are found in middle class schools
but not in low-income schools.' 2 While money matters a great deal in
education, people matter more. Consider the three main sets of
actors in a school: students, parents, and faculty (teachers and
principals).
Research suggests that students learn a great deal from their
peers, so it is an advantage to have classmates who are academically
engaged and aspire to go on to college. Peers in middle-income
schools are more likely to do homework and to graduate, and less
likely to watch television and cut class than their counterparts in highpoverty schools-all of which have been found to influence the
behavior of classmates. 3 Middle class schools report disorder
problems half as often as low-income schools, so more learning goes
on in these schools. 4 It is also an advantage to have high-achieving
peers, whose knowledge is shared informally with classmates all day
long. Middle class peers come to schools with twice the vocabulary of
low-income children, so any given child is more likely to expand his
vocabulary in a middle class school through informal interaction. 5
10. Russell W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The
Impact of Student Composition on Academic Achievement in High School, 107 TCHRS. C.

REC. 1999,2014 (2005).
11. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF

EDUCATION 2006, at 47 (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs 2006/2006071.pdf.
12. KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 47-76.
13. Id. at 51-58.
14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 50.
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Parents are also an important part of the school community, and
research finds that students perform better in schools where parents
are actively involved, volunteer in the classroom, and hold school
officials accountable. 6 In this regard, middle class schools have a
definite advantage over low-income schools. Parents with meager
incomes, particularly those working multiple jobs, may not have the
time to be active volunteers.1 7 Yet, irrespective of the cause, the
disparity between schools on opposite sides of the socioeconomic
spectrum is sizeable. Parents of students in middle class schools are
four times more likely than those in low-income schools to be
members of parent-teacher organizations and are much more likely to
participate in fundraising.' 8
Finally, research finds that the best teachers, on average, are
attracted to middle class schools. 9 Nationally, teachers in middle
class schools are more likely to be licensed to teach in their field of
expertise,2 ° to have high teacher test scores, to be experienced, and to
have greater formal education. 21 Teachers generally consider it a
promotion to move from poor to middle class schools, and the best
teachers usually transfer into middle-income schools at the first
opportunity. 22 Moreover, teachers in middle class schools are more
likely to have high expectations. Nationally, research has found that
the grade of C in a middle-income school is the same as a grade of A
in a low-income school, as measured by standardized tests results.2 3
Middle class schools are also more likely to offer advanced placement
classes and high-level math.24

16. Id. at 61-67.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 62-64.
19. Id. at 67.
20. Because of teacher shortages in hard-to-staff schools, low-income schools
frequently fill vacancies by granting emergency licenses to teachers who do not have
sufficient education or experience to otherwise obtain teaching certification.
21. KAHLENBERG, supranote 1, at 67-72.
22. Id.; see also Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of
Teachers and Principals,85 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1362-64 (2007) (explaining the tendency of
existing teachers to move to more advantaged districts).
23. MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES
12 (1997), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content-storage_01/
0000000b/80/22/64/0a.pdf.
24. Id. at 72-74; see also Henry M. Levin, On the Relationship Between Poverty and
Curriculum, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1381, 1399 (2007) (explaining that low-income students have
fewer opportunities to access advanced placement classes).
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II. VOLUNTARY PLANS FOR SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL
INTEGRATION

For years, policymakers consciously and consistently ignored the
wide body of research finding that educating low-income and middle
class students in separate schools was inherently unequal. Many
school officials have accepted economic school segregation as
inevitable, because efforts to provide greater economic balance in
schooling challenges the deeply held notion that wealthy parents have
a right to purchase homes in affluent neighborhoods and send their
children to public schools that in effect exclude less well-off children.
But in recent years, as policymakers have grappled with the goal
of reducing the achievement gap under NCLB, some have come to
terms with the reality that no one really knows how to make high-

poverty schools work on a systemwide basis. Some districts have
concluded that, rather than trying to achieve the nearly impossible,
measures should be taken to ensure that more students have a chance
to attend good, solidly middle class public schools. In a nation in
which nearly two-thirds of students are middle class, 5 some officials
have sought to eliminate the existence of high-poverty schools.
Today, about forty districts nationally, with some 2.5 million

students, are known to consider socioeconomic status as a factor in
student assignment.2 6

One of the leading districts to pursue

25. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS, STAFF, SCHOOLS, AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS:

SCHOOL YEAR 2003-04, at 1 (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006307.pdf
(noting that 36% of students were eligible for free or reduced-price meals).

26. Many more districts may in fact consider socioeconomic status.
KAHLENBERG,

A

NEW

WAY

ON

SCHOOL INTEGRATION

2

(2006),

RICHARD D.
available at

Jurisdictions with
http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/schoolintegration.pdf.
districtwide plans include the following (student populations are listed in parentheticals):
Cambridge School District, Mass. (6,103); Christina School District, Del. (19,364); Coweta
County Public School District, Ga. (19,685); La Crosse School District, Wis. (7,300);
McKinney Independent School District, Tex. (19,743); Moorpark United School District,
Cal. (7,773); Rochester City School District, N.Y. (34,000); San Jose Unified School
District, Cal. (31,874); St. Lucie County Public School District, Fla. (34,786); Wake County
School District, N.C. (109,424); and Williamsburg-James County School District, Va.
(9,402). Id. at 11 n.10. Jurisdictions in which socioeconomic status is used as a factor in
student assignment to some of the schools include Austin Independent School District,
Tex. (79,707); Baltimore Public School District, Md. (108,523); Berkeley Unified School
District, Cal. (8,904); Brandywine Public School District, Del. (10,602); Charles County
School District, Md. (25,610); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public School District, N.C.

(114,071); Clark County Public School District, Nev. (270,607); Duval County Public
School District, Fla. (128,023); Eugene Public School District, Or. (18,207); Fresno Unified
School District, Fla. (80,760); Greenville County Public School District, S.C. (64,245);
Guilford County Public School District, N.C. (66,971); Hamilton County Public School
District, Tenn. (40,655); Manatee County School District, Fla. (40,006); Manchester
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socioeconomic school integration is Wake County, North Carolina, a
dynamic and growing jurisdiction of more than 120,000 students,
which includes the city of Raleigh and its surrounding suburbs.27 In
2000, the Wake County School Board voted to replace a longstanding
racial integration plan with a goal that no school in the district should
have more than 40% of students eligible for free and reduced-price
lunch, and no school should have more than 25% of students

performing below grade level. 8 Wake County's plan is receiving
considerable national attention because the early results suggest it is
working to raise achievement of all students and narrow the gap
between socioeconomic groups.29

The challenge, of course, is in determining precisely how to
overcome residential segregation by economic status. Wake County
decided

to implement economic school integration in part by

redrawing school district boundaries and in part through extensive
use of magnet schools, with special arts and music programs, foreign
language options, and the like.30 Almost all of the special-theme
magnets, established during the district's earlier efforts to promote
racial integration, are located in high-poverty areas in Raleigh.3 In
general, 30% of the magnet students are assigned from the local

School District, Conn. (7,800); Miami-Dade Public School District, Fla. (369,223);
Montgomery County Public School District, Md. (139,311); New York City Public Schools:
Community School Districts 10, 13, 14, 15, 20, and 21, N.Y. (206,151); Omaha Public
School District, Neb. (46,035); Palm Beach County School District, Fla. (169,381);
Portland Public School District, Or. (44,169); Proviso Township High Schools, I11.(4,852);
Rock Hill Public School District of York County, S.C. (16,179); Rutherford
CountylMurfreesboro School District, Tenn. (32,959); San Francisco Unified School
District, Cal. (56,236); Seminole County Public Schools, Fla. (21,457); South OrangeMaplewood Public School District, N.J. (6,559); and Springdale Public School District,
Ark. (13,678). Id.
27. Wake County Public School System, Basic Facts, http://www.wcpss.net/basicfacts.
html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
28. Susan Leigh Flinspach & Karen E. Banks, Moving Beyond Race, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 261,271 fig.12.1 (John Charles Boger
& Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
29. See, e.g., Todd Silberman, Wake County Schools: A Question of Balance, in
DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 141, 162

(Century Found. Task Force on the Common Sch. ed., 2002), available at http://www.
tcf.org/Publications/Education/silberman.pdf; Alan Finder, As Test Scores Jump, Raleigh
Credits Integration by Income, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, § 1, at 1; Jeffrey Robb, N.C.
City Refocused Its Integration Goal in 2000, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 24, 2006, at
1A.
30. Telephone Interview with Caroline Massengill, former Senior Director of Magnet
Programs and current Special Assistant for Year-Round Schools, Wake County Public
School System, North Carolina (Feb. 3, 2006).
31. Id.
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neighborhoods and the rest are drawn in from other areas."
Although many of the magnet programs are located in tough
neighborhoods, several are oversubscribed-particularly those
programs which allow students to take electives in elementary
school.33 In the 2004-05 school year, more than half of magnet school
applications in Wake County were denied.34 The popularity of Wake
County's magnet schools suggests that parents will not oppose
integrated schooling when the school system makes integration part
of an attractive offering.
Other communities pursuing socioeconomic integration have
Cambridge,
gone even further in the use of magnet schools.
Massachusetts, for example, has a plan in which all schools should
have comparable percentages of students who are eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch, and every school in its system is a magnet
schoo135-a school chosen by parents with a particular theme or
teaching approach. Using a system known as "controlled choice,"
devised by Charles Willie of Harvard and Michael Alves, a private
consultant formerly with Brown University, all families choose among
several elementary schools, each of which offers a distinctive
program.36 Parents rank their preferences, and students are assigned
with an eye to achieving economic school integration.37 The vast
majority-more than 90%-receive one of their first three choices.3 8
These socioeconomic integration programs are fairly new but are
beginning to show signs of success. In Wake County, for example, the
county's low-income students are doing substantially better than lowincome students in other large urban North Carolina districts with
concentrated poverty. On the 2005 high school end-of-course exams,
63.8% of Wake County's low-income students passed, compared with
low-income passage rates of 47.8% in Mecklenburg County, 47.9% in
Guilford County, 51.8% in Forsyth County, and 48.7% in Durham

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. OFFICE OF INNOVATION & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CREATING

SUCCESSFUL MAGNET SCHOOLS PROGRAMS 51 (2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/

admins/comm/choice/magnet/report.pdf.
35. See CAMBRIDGE PUB. SCH., CONTROLLED CHOICE PLAN 1-2 (2001), available at
http://www.cpsd.us/web/pubinfo/controlledchoice.pdf.
36. KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 116.
37. Edward B. Fiske, Controlled Choice in Cambridge,Massachusetts, in DIVIDED WE
FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 29, at 167,
192-93, availableat http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/fiske.pdf.
38. Sara Rimer, Schools Try Integration by Income, Not Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2003, at Al.
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County.39 Likewise, 64.3% of Wake County's African-American
students passed, compared with black passage rates of 46.8% in
Mecklenburg County, 47.5% in Guilford County, 51.9% in Forsyth
County, and 52.7% in Durham County.'
Meanwhile, Wake County's middle class students are achieving
at very high levels, and there is no evidence that they are being
harmed academically by economic mixing. The results in Wake
County are consistent with national research that finds middle class
students do well in economically integrated schools so long as
concentrations of poverty do not reach above the 50% level.4" This is
true in part because the majority sets the tone in a school, and in part
because middle class students, on average, are less affected (for good
or ill) by school environment than low-income students.4 2
In
switching from race to socioeconomic status as a basis for school
integration, Wake County and other districts-like Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and San Francisco, California-were driven by both
legal and educational considerations: voluntary economic integration
is less risky as a legal matter, and it is more directly related to raising
student achievement than is racial integration.
A.

Legal Considerations

Some districts are pursuing socioeconomic school integration, in
part, because they value racial diversity and know that using
socioeconomic status will produce a racial dividend in a race-neutral
way. Under longstanding Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the
government's use of race is held to a tough standard of "strict
scrutiny,"" while the use of economic status need meet only the more
relaxed "rational basis" test.' Indeed, the use of race in elementary
and secondary school assignment is now being challenged in the U.S.
Supreme Court in two cases: ParentsInvolved in Community Schools

39. See ACCOUNTABILITY SERVs. Div., N.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., STATE/LEA AND
SCHOOL TEST PERFORMANCE, http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/reporting/
leaperformancearchive (follow "2004-2005" hyperlink, select each school system
individually in the school system pull down bar, select "LEA" on the school pull-down
bar, select "Composite" on the subject pull down bar, click the "View Report" button).
North Carolina's focal cities in Mecklenburg, Guilford, Forsyth, and Durham counties are
Charlotte, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Durham, respectively.
40. Id.
41. KAHLENBERG, supranote 1, at 39-40.
42. Id. at 37-42.
43. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,201 (1995).
44. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,486-88 (1955).
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v. Seattle School District No. 145 and McFarland v. Jefferson County
Public Schools.46

On the merits, a strong case exists for continuing to use race in
student assignment where socioeconomic status does not by itself
produce sufficient racial diversity. Promoting academic achievement
is not the sole function of a school. Instead, schools also work to
Racial integration is
foster tolerant adults and good citizens.

important to furthering these goals.47 By definition, there is no better
way to ensure racial integration than employing race per se in student

assignment. And the use of race in K-12 assignment does not
normally raise the thorny issues of merit that are implicated in racial

affirmative action policies or programs at selective institutions of
higher education.' Should the U.S. Supreme Court decide to curtail
the use of race in the Seattle and Louisville cases, however,
socioeconomic integration would provide an attractive alternative for
a number of school districts seeking to promote racial integration in a

race-neutral manner. Even opponents of using race in student
assignment concede that using socioeconomic status is perfectly
legal.49 And while there is clearly no better way to ensure a certain
racial mix than by using race per se, socioeconomic integration can
produce a substantial racial dividend.
First of all, African-American and other minority students are
almost three times as likely as white students to be low-income. For
45. 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 5, 2006)
(No. 05-908) (challenging the use of a race-based "tiebreaker" in Seattle high school
assignments).
46. 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915)
(challenging the use of racial guidelines in student assignments).
47. See, e.g., Jomills Henry Braddock II et al., A Long-Term View of School
Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduatesas Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259,

260 (1984) ("Data ... suggest that school desegregation is leading to desegregation in
several areas of adult life."); Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 795, 822-23 (1996) ("Research continues to show benefits to race relations from
interracial contact ... ").
48. For two examples of the difficulty presented by racial affirmative action policies in
the forum of higher education, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), companion cases which considered-and drew fine line
distinctions between-admission policies at the University of Michigan that used race as a
factor in considering applicants.
49. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
24-25, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, No. 05-908
(U.S. Aug. 21, 2006), available at 2006 WL 2415458 (citing socioeconomic considerations
as a valid race-neutral alternative); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, No.
05-915 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2006), available at 2006 WL 460622 (same).
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example, among fourth-grade students nationally in 2005, 24% of
whites, but 70% of African Americans and 73% of Latinos were
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.50 Moreover, within the
universe of low-income students, poor blacks are more likely than
poor whites to live in concentrated poverty and attend high-poverty
schools. The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, for example,
found that in the 2003-04 school year, only 15% of schools with less
than 10% minority populations were high-poverty, compared with
76% of schools with greater than 90% minority populations.5 1
Given these realities, policies that break up concentrations of
poverty will disproportionately affect African Americans. According
to a 2002 Century Foundation study conducted by Duncan Chaplin of
the Urban Institute, integrating poor and nonpoor students results in
55.6% as much black/white integration as poor/nonpoor integration
when schools pursue districtwide integration programs.5 2
If
integration occurs at the metropolitan level-integrating city and
suburb-79.9% as much black/white integration occurs as compared
to poor/nonpoor integration.5 3 Chaplin concluded, "To summarize,
although economic integration is no guarantee of racial integration, it
does appear that substantial impacts are possible and that the largest
impacts may occur where they are needed most."54
When Wake County schools switched in 2000 from a policy of
racial integration to one that emphasizes socioeconomic integration,
much of the racial integration was preserved. Susan Leigh Flinspach
of the University of California found that there was a 73.2%
agreement between the old racial standard-that all schools should
be between 15% and 45% minority-and the new income diversity
policy that all schools should have no more than 40% of students be
eligible for subsidized lunch and no more than 25% performing below
grade level.5
Moreover, Flinspach and Karen Banks found that
64.6% of Wake County schools were racially desegregated in 199950. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 119 tbl.6-1.
51.

GARY ORFIELD & CHUMGMEI

LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION

AND THE

CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 31 tbl.14 (2006), availableat http://www.civilrights

project.harvard.edu/research/deseg/RacialTransformation.pdf.
52. Duncan Chaplin, Estimating the Impact of Economic Integration of Schools on
Racial Integration, in DIVIDED WE FAIL:
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note

COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC

29, at 87, 98 tbl.2.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 102.
55. Susan Leigh Flinspach, Desegregation in the Post-Brown Era: Socioeconomic
Diversity Policies in Student Assignment 12 tbl.1 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the American Educational Research Association Conference, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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2000 under the old racial integration policy and that 63.3% of schools
were racially desegregated under the new socioeconomic integration
policy two years later. 6 Wake County, in other words, was able to
sustain virtually as much racial integration under its new policy of
socioeconomic integration as its old race-conscious integration policy.
B.

EducationalConsiderations

Socioeconomic integration is not, however, just a backdoor way
of achieving racial integration; it has important positive effects on
academic achievement which, in fact, exceed those associated with
racial integration. Education research has long suggested that the
economic mix of a school matters more than the racial mix in
determining the academic achievement of students. In 1966, Coleman
found that the "beneficial effect of a student body with a high
proportion of white students comes not from racial composition per
se, but from the better educational background and higher
educational aspirations that are, on the average, found among white
students."57 More recent research confirms this notion.58 Indeed,
Harvard professor Gary Orfield, a strong proponent of racial
desegregation, notes that "[e]ducational research suggests that the
basic damage inflicted by segregated education comes not from racial
concentration but from the concentration of children from poor
families."59
Racial desegregation raised the academic achievement of
African-American students in some districts, not because blacks
benefited from sitting next to whites, but because low-income
students do better in middle class schools. In places like Charlotte,
North Carolina, where racial mixing also involved economic mixing,
achievement gains were strong.6 ° In comparison, no significant
achievement gains were found in places like Boston, Massachusetts,
where low-income white students were integrated with low-income
black students. 6' This contrast makes sense when one thinks about
56. Flinspach & Banks, supra note 28, at 261, 275.
57. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 307.
58. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 36, 275 n.61.
59. GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL
See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUMGMEI LEE, WHY
POLICY 69 (1978).
SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), available

at

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Why-SegregMatters.pdf

(exploring school and student segregation by poverty and how it relates to racial
inequality).
60. KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 35-37.

61. See id. at 222.
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the mechanics of why integration matters. For example, it is an
advantage to have both peers who are academically engaged-not
cutting class or choosing television over homework-and parents who
are actively involved in the school. These behaviors track much more
closely by class than race.62
In sum, socioeconomic integration and racial integration are both
important. While integrating students of various socioeconomic
backgrounds proves more effective than racial integration at
improving the academic achievement of poorer students,
socioeconomic integration does not guarantee the same level of racial
diversity.
C.

Socioeconomic Integration Through No Child Left Behind
Transfers

In theory, NCLB dovetails nicely with the efforts in Wake
County, Cambridge, and elsewhere to promote economic school
integration through public school choice.63 One of the key provisions
in the Act, section 1116, provides that if a Title I school-a school
with a significant share of low-income students-fails to make
adequate yearly progress ("AYP") for two consecutive years,
students have the right to transfer to a better-performing public
school, and the district must pay for transportation costs. 64 By
limiting the transfer remedy to Title I schools-roughly speaking, the
bottom economic half of American public schools 65 -the law
recognizes that students stuck in higher-poverty schools have a
greater need to seek better opportunities.
Moreover, the mechanism the law uses for identifying failing
schools maximizes the chances that those Title I schools with the most
highly concentrated poverty will be subject to the transfer provision.
NCLB measures AYP in absolute terms, rather than by examining
the value added by a school.66 It requires schools to reach a certain
62. Id. at 35-37.
63. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
64. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A), (E) (Supp. II 2002). Section 1116 is the key provision
on public school choice.
65. Roughly 50,000 of America's 94,000 public schools receive Title I funding based
on their relatively high concentrations of poverty. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT: EDUCATION NEEDS To PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CONDUCT IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES FOR SCHOOL

CHOICE PROVISION 1, 6 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d057.pdf. Approximately

twenty-five million of America's forty-nine million public school students attend Title Ireceiving schools. Id. at 5.
66. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(B)-(C), (b)(3).
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threshold, irrespective of the percentage of students facing
disadvantages at home. As a result, the Act conflates the influence of
family and school on achievement. Because low-income students, on
average, perform at lower levels academically, even before they begin
school, requiring schools to reach an absolute threshold of
achievement tends to overidentify higher-poverty schools as failing.
In the 2003-04 school year, those Title I schools identified as failingthereby being required to provide transfers to their students-were
comprised of a student population that was, on average, 62% low
income.67 In contrast, those Title I schools that were not required to
provide school choice had student populations that were only 49%
low income.68 In the 2005-06 school year, 16% of Title I schools
nationally were identified as in need of improvement; among the
highest-poverty schools (90% to 100% low income), however, that
figure was 36%.69
Guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Education pushes
even further in the direction of encouraging economic school
integration by 1) requiring districts to give a priority in certain
circumstances to low-income, low-achieving students wishing to
transfer;7" 2) providing that capacity and limitations on space cannot
be used as a valid excuse for higher-performing schools to refuse to
take in transferring pupils,7' and 3) encouraging districts to set up
cooperative enterprises for interdistrict public school choice.72
Receiving schools must, for example, reconfigure unused space to
make room for transfer students.73
Philosophically, NCLB directly challenges the idea that, through
the choice of housing, parents may "purchase" the right to send their
children to a public school where all the children come from
privileged backgrounds. Implicit in the provisions providing a federal
right to transfer to better-performing public schools is the message
that good public schools should be open to all-not just those who
67. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 11 fig.2.
68. Id.
69. Jeff Archer, Building Capacity, in LEADING FOR LEARNING S3, S12 (2006),
availableat http://www.edweek.org/media/03wallace.pdf.
70. U.S.
GUIDANCE

DEP'T

OF

EDUC.,

PUBLIC

SCHOOL

CHOICE:

NON-REGULATORY

8 (Draft 2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoice

guid.pdL
71. Id. at 14-15.
72. Id. at 16-17.
73. CYNTHIA G. BROWN, CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHOOSING BETTER
SCHOOLS: A REPORT ON STUDENT TRANSFERS UNDER THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND

ACT 62 (Dianne M. Pichd & William L. Taylor eds., 2004), available at http://www.cccr.
org/ChoosingBetterSchools.pdf.
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can afford to live in a certain neighborhood. In addition, by
mandating that districts pay transportation costs for students, NCLB
rejects the argument that spending dollars on busing is a wasteful
diversion of money from the classroom.74 In theory, then, NCLB
should be a strong vehicle for economic school integration-a feature
of the law that some liberal backers of NCLB highlight.7 5
Experience under NCLB so far has tested this theory, however,

and several problems have emerged that undercut the promise of
integration

under

NCLB.

A December

2004 study by the

Government Accountability Office ("GAO") found that of the
roughly 3.3 million students in Title I schools who were eligible to

transfer in the 2003-04 school year, only 31,500 transferred, which is
less than one percent.76 Moreover, there is some early evidence to
suggest that middle class children in Title I failing schools are more
likely to take advantage of choice provisions than low-income
students, but the data is very limited and the differences are
sometimes small.77
The low levels of student transfers have been linked primarily to

two key limitations in the Act. 78 First, there are strong incentives for
middle class, high-performing schools to refuse to take in low-income

transfer students. As the University of Virginia's James Ryan notes,
a receiving school that takes in low-income students faces a double

risk.79 Because low-income students, on average, score lower than
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(9)-(10) (Supp. II 2002).
75. See BROWN, supra note 73, at 3 ("[Bjoth public school choice and supplemental
services can be very useful tools in improving educational opportunities for disadvantaged'
children."). "[C]hoice will in some instances offer opportunities for desegregation as well,
opportunities that will benefit all children." Id.
76. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 15 fig.5. Other studies
come to a similar conclusion. In their study of ten states and fifty-three additional
districts, the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights put the estimate at 1.7%. BROWN,
supra note 73, at 6; see also Lynn Olson, NCLB Choice Option Going Untapped, but
Tutoring Picking Up, EDUC. WK., Mar. 16, 2005, at 1 (finding that 1% of eligible students
transferred to a higher-performing school); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION &
REG'L ASSISTANCE, U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL

ASSESSMENT

OF TITLE I:

INTERIM REPORT, at xii, 62 exhibit 41 (2006) [hereinafter NATIONAL ASSESSMENT]

(finding that 1% of students transferred in 2003-04).
77. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 17-18. For a more
powerful finding of middle class take-up in the Washington, D.C. area, see Maria Glod,
High Achievers Leaving Schools Behind, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at Al.
78. A third problem involves an administrative issue. Many districts notify parents
that their children are eligible to transfer only after the school year has begun. See
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 76, at xiii (finding that 49% of school districts
notified parents after the school year had begun).
79. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 961-63 (2004).
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middle class children,8" an influx of low-income transfer students is
likely to initially depress aggregate school scores, increasing the
chances that the receiving school will itself fail to make AYP. The
other risk stems from a laudable feature of the legislation: the
requirement that schools do a good job not only of raising proficiency
in general, but also of raising the scores of certain groups of students,
disaggregated by race and income.8 Homogenous schools with few
poor or minority students are exempt from this requirement, because
a critical mass of students is required to make disaggregation
statistically valid.82 An influx of poor and/or minority students,
however, may increase the risk that the school fails to meet AYP.
Such an influx might push a receiving school over the threshold
number, triggering disaggregation and increasing the number of
targets a school has to hit to make AYP. 83 This provides, says Ryan,
"an incentive to minimize the number of African American or poor
students in a school or district."'
The second major problem that has emerged with respect to the
student transfer provision is the shortage of high-quality receiving
schools in certain high-poverty districts. In Chicago, for example, the
GAO found that, although 19,000 students applied for transfers in
2003-04, the vast majority-almost 18,000-were unable to transfer
because higher-performing schools were full to capacity.85
In
Baltimore, only 301 seats in high-performing schools were available
for some 27,000 students who were eligible to transfer.86 In a study of
ten states and fifty-three additional districts, the Citizens'
Commission on Civil Rights found that in 2003-04, less than half of
87
those who requested a transfer received one.
The GAO also found that the receiving schools that many
districts offered as transfer options were only marginally better than
the home schools. Some had failed to make AYP for one year and
were themselves at risk of having to provide transfers out the

80. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 61.

81. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (Supp. II 2002).
82. Ryan, supra note 79, at 962.
83. See id. (citing a report finding that Texas schools just below the threshold number
were rated as "exemplary" at a rate of more than double those schools that were right on
the threshold mark).
84. Id.
85. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 26 tbl.7.
86. PAUL T. HILL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST.,
PORTFOLIO APPROACH TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (2006).

87. BROWN, supra note 73, at 6.

PUT
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following year. 8 A study of ten urban districts by the Civil Rights
Project at Harvard University also found that receiving schools "did
not have substantially higher achievement levels or lower poverty
rates, on average, than schools required to offer the NCLB transfer
option. As a result, many students who transferred went from one
levels to another with similarly low
school with low achievement
89
achievement levels.

Although NCLB encourages school districts, when faced with
capacity problems, to set up "cooperative agreements" with other
districts to handle transfers, doing so is entirely voluntary.' The
Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights reported in their May 2004
study of several states and districts that only two had provided
interdistrict transfers under NCLB. 91
With a few critical changes to the law, however, NCLB could
translate its theoretical potential into actual support for
socioeconomic school integration of the type taking place in
As amended,
communities like Wake County and Cambridge.'
NCLB could move what a small number of communities are doing on
their own to a national program of giving poor children a chance to
attend middle class schools. The basic framework and philosophical
assumption is already written into the legislation: poor children stuck
in bad schools should have the right to transfer to better public school
schools. Five key changes are needed, however, to move from theory
to practice.
1. Change the Incentive Structure so that High-Performing Schools
Are Encouraged To Recruit, Rather than Shun, Low-Income
Transfer Students
First, steps should be taken to change the incentives so that it is
easier for students to transfer out of failing schools into succeeding
ones. There is a growing consensus across the ideological spectrum
88. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 23-24.
89.

JIMMY KIM & GAIL L. SUNDERMAN, DOES NCLB PROVIDE GOOD CHOICES

FOR STUDENTS IN LoW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS? 6 (2004), available at http://www.civil

rightsproject.harvard.edu/research/esea/goodschoices.pdf.
90. See BROWN, supra note 73, at 62 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 70, at
16).

91. Id. at 67. There are more than 14,000 school districts in the United States. See
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION

STATISTICS, 2004, tbl.85 (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/list
tables.asp (follow "Schools and School Districts" hyperlink; then follow "Table 85"
hyperlink).
92. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
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that the existing incentive structure is flawed because it pushes good
schools away from accepting transfers under NCLB. Liberal groups
like the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights
Project at Harvard University, and conservative commentators such
as Chester Finn of the Fordham Foundation and Frederick Hess of
the American Enterprise Institute, note that the current system
penalizes principals who accept low-income NCLB transfer students
into their high-performing schools because they are immediately held
accountable for the incoming students' home environments and
previous (and inferior) educational opportunities.93
To curb the disincentive for receiving schools, Finn and Hess
suggest assessing transfer students based on whether schools
strengthen the academic growth of incoming students, not based on
whether they fail to make heroic gains toward an absolute standard. 4
They also suggest basing AYP "only on the performance of [those]
pupils who have been [in a school] for at least two years."" The
Citizens' Commission for Civil Rights, likewise, suggests a grace
period before schools are held accountable for transfer student
performance, particularly if 10% or more of a school's enrollment is
made up of such students.9 6 Likewise, research has consistently found
that it is more expensive, on average, to educate low-income students
to high levels of achievement than to do the same for middle class
students.97 In order to reduce resistance to transfers from receiving
schools, the Civil Rights Project at Harvard suggests that receiving
schools should be provided extra funds in order to compensate for
those increased costs.98
Given the strong evidence suggesting that socioeconomic
integration will reduce the achievement gap and raise overall levels of
achievement, NCLB should also bestow affirmative financial bonuses
to receiving middle class schools to provide an incentive to spur such
93. BROWN, supra note 73, at 13-14; Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Frederick M. Hess, On
Leaving No Child Behind, PUB. INT., Fall 2004, at 52; see also GAIL L. SUNDERMAN ET
AL., NCLB MEETS SCHOOL REALITIES: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 55 (2005) (advocating
the use of "financial incentives" to encourage high-performing schools to admit transfer
students).
94. Finn & Hess, supra note 93, at 52.
95. Id.
96. BROWN, supra note 73, at 13-14.
97. See, e.g., MD. COMM'N ON EDUC. FIN., EQUITY, AND EXCELLENCE, FINAL
REPORT 11, 13 (2001), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/other/education/final/2002final-report.pdf (citing a school adequacy study that concluded that in order to achieve
state educational standards, a school system would need to spend approximately 1.39
times as much on students eligible for free and reduced-price meals as on other students).
98. KIM & SUNDERMAN, supra note 89, at 33.

1564

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

schools to actively recruit transfer students. A weighted studentfunding formula, in which low-income students receive extra funds,
might encourage more suburban schools to receive low-achieving
students if the weighting is sufficiently pronounced.9 9
One of the central insights of NCLB is that a system of standards
and accountability can meld the important benefits of public
education with the incentive structure of the private sector. The
system of testing, accountability, and sanctions is built around the
concept that incentives matter-and that insight must be extended to
the student transfer process as well.
2. Require Interdistrict Public School Choice Where Individual
Districts Lack Capacity
Second, where individual school districts lack the capacity to
offer room at better-performing public schools, NCLB should require
that interdistrict public school choice options be made available.
NCLB took the important step of amending the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, which had previously encouraged
districts to give students stuck in failing high-poverty schools the
chance to transfer to a better public school, to require districts to do
so if they wish to receive federal funds. 1°° The same lesson now
applies to interdistrict public school choice. NCLB encourages
districts to allow public school choice across school district lines in
cases where there is not enough room in good schools within the
district, but virtually no group of school districts has done so
voluntarily."0 ' Interdistrict choice should become mandatory.
Such a requirement faces severe political obstacles. When the
issue was debated during deliberations on NCLB in 2001, Democratic
lawmakers fought against an interdistrict school choice requirement,
fearing a loss of funds for city schools. 1°2 But interdistrict school
choice programs have long existed outside of NCLB, and it is possible
99. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY &
ANTIQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE 21 (2006), available at http://www.100percentsolution.
org/fundthechild/FundtheChild062706.pdf (advocating a weighted student funding
approach). For a variation on this idea, see Julian R. Betts, The Economic Theory of
School Choice, in GETTING CHOICE RIGHT:

ENSURING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN

EDUCATION POLICY 14, 33-35 (Julian R. Betts and Tom Loveless eds., 2005) (suggesting
a tradable market in the right to enroll high-achieving students).
100. See BROWN, supra note 73, at 22.
101. See id. at 67 (finding in a study of several states that only two provided
interdistrict transfers under NCLB).
102. Diana Jean Schemo, Schools Face New Policy on Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2002, at A26.
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to learn from the political lessons of these programs to construct
workable transfer provisions for NCLB.
One lesson is that financial incentives work. In Michigan, school
districts actually compete to attract interdistrict transfers because
state funds travel with students to receiving districts. Between the
1996-97 and 2002-03 school years, the number of interdistrict
transfers increased from 7,836 (0.5% of Michigan students) to 43,756
(2.3% of students), and the percentage of districts electing to accept
nonresident students increased from 36.8% to 69.4%.1°3 Likewise, St.
Louis's large scale urban-suburban transfer program, initially set up
under a court-monitored desegregation agreement, was continued
voluntarily in 1999 by the legislature in part because suburban
districts became dependent on state funding from the program and
provided critical political support.1"
A second lesson is that placing caps on transfers can help assure
nervous middle class school districts that an influx of city students will
not result in poverty concentrations within suburban schools. In St.
Louis, where the transfer program focused on race, suburban school
district populations were never required to become more than 25%
African American under the plan." 5
Both concepts-financial
incentives and a cap on the number of student transfers (say, at 50%
free and reduced-price lunch)-should be written into NCLB so that
the success of students in St. Louis can be replicated throughout the
nation.
There is a third reason to think interdistrict transfers can be
made politically acceptable: the threat of private school vouchers.
Today, there is widespread agreement across the political spectrum
that limiting transfers to other schools within certain urban
jurisdictions is unworkable: it is patently clear that there simply are
not enough good schools into which students can transfer.10 6 The
primary conservative answer to this dilemma is to open up choice to
private schools, allowing students to use taxpayer-financed vouchers
103. David N. Plank & Christopher Dunbar, Jr., Michigan: False Start, in LEAVING NO
CHILD BEHIND? OPTIONS FOR KIDS IN FAILING SCHOOLS 137, 138-39 (Frederick M.
Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 2004).

104. William H. Freivogel, St. Louis: Desegregation and School Choice in the Land of
Dred Scott, in DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE, supra note 29, at 209, 209-11.
105. CENTURY FOUND. TASK FORCE ON THE COMMON SCH., REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE, in DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL
CHOICE, supra note 29, at 9, 42-43.
106. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 73, at 6, 8-9; SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at
53-55.
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While vouchers are a bad proposal for

the threat of vouchers may push advocates of public

schools (including teacher unions) to endorse interdistrict public
school choice as a superior alternative. Politically, if the battle comes
down to interdistrict public school choice versus publicly funded
private school vouchers, history suggests public school choice will
prevail. An estimated 300,000 to 500,000 students cross school district
lines every day to attend public school in another district-more than

ten times the number who use publicly funded vouchers for private
school. 1°9
Interdistrict choice is already receiving support from some

surprising quarters. Prominent conservative educator Chester Finn
supports strengthening NCLB's interdistrict transfer provisions." 0
Further, the Department of Education's 2007 competition for grants
under the Voluntary Public School Choice Program provides a

substantial preference for interdistrict school choice."'
3. Manage Transfers To Avoid a Cascade of Failing Schools
Third, steps should be taken to avoid the problem identified by
the GAO: that students from failing schools (those which failed to

make AYP for two consecutive years) often transfer to near-failing

schools (those which have not made AYP for one year)."12 A large

influx of low-income students into a school on the verge of failure can
quickly tip the scales against it. To address this problem, student
transfers should be provided only to schools which have consistently
made AYP and are thus not in danger of failing. Moreover, given the
107. Florida's voucher program-recently struck down by the courts-was based on
the idea that students stuck in failing public schools should have a right to publicly funded
private school vouchers. See Sam Dillon, Florida Supreme Court Blocks School Vouchers,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2006, at A16.
108. See generally PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE VS. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS
(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2003) (outlining the arguments against voucher programs).
109. BROWN, supra note 73, at 67 (estimating that "well over one-half million"
students attend public school in another district); Richard Lee Colvin, Public School
Choice: An Overview, in LEAVING No CHILD BEHIND? OPTIONS FOR KIDS IN FAILING
SCHOOLS, supra note 103, at 11, 16 (showing that roughly 36,000 students receive publicly
supported private school vouchers); Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature
and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 13, 29 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999) (estimating that 300,000 students attend public school in another district).
110. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Book Review, EDUC. GADFLY, May 27, 2004, http://www.ed
excellence.net/institute/gadfly/issue.cfm?edition=&id=150#1844.
111. Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, 72 Fed.
Reg. 4700, 4700-01 (Feb. 1, 2007).
112. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 23-24.
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strong relationship between concentrations of poverty and school
learning environment, opportunities should be provided first for
students to transfer to lower-poverty schools;113 and once schools
reach a 50% threshold, they should no longer be required to receive
additional low-income students.
4. Increase Funding for Magnet Schools in Urban Areas
Fourth, to balance the flow of students and money under an
interdistrict public school choice program, federal funding for magnet
schools in urban areas should be substantially increased. Allowing
students to move from bad schools to good schools will, in the short
term, usually mean transferring from high-poverty city schools to
middle class suburban schools, but many districts-including Wake
County-have successfully achieved socioeconomic integration by
simultaneously attracting middle class children into urban schools
through magnet programs.' 4 Choice should allow movement in both
directions, and in places like Hartford, Connecticut, a roughly equal
number of students travel from suburb to city as from city to
suburb." 5 Experience suggests that given the right program, magnet
schools can attract middle class suburban students to schools located
in some of the toughest urban neighborhoods. In Hartford, for
example, a Montessori magnet school, located near boarded-up
buildings, has a long waiting list of white, middle class suburban
children because the program offered at the end of the bus ride is
excellent.1 16 Nationally, an estimated 150,000 students are on waiting
lists for magnet schools.117 Some 1.2 million students attend an
18
estimated 2,400 magnet schools across the country.
The federal government currently appropriates roughly $100
million for the Magnet Schools Assistance Program.1 9 This compares

113. For the purposes of this Article, lower-poverty schools are those with 50% or
fewer students receiving free and reduced-price lunch.
See supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
115.

RICHARD D.

KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUND., HELPING CHILDREN MOVE

FROM BAD SCHOOLS TO GOOD ONES 11 (2006), available at http://www.tcf.org/

Publications/Education/kahlenbergsoa6-15-06.pdf.
116. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The New Brown: Integration by Class, Not Race, Can Fix
Schools in Poor Cities, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2003, at 30-31, available at http://www.legal

affairs.org/issues/May-June-2003/feature-kahlenberg__mayjun03.msp.
117. Colvin, supra note 109, at 13.
118. Id. at 25.
119. BROWN, supra note 73, at 26.
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to the more than $12.7 billion spent on Title I 2 -- a ratio of 1:127.
Given the powerful evidence that socioeconomic school integration is
generally much more promising than compensatory spending in lowincome schools, this imbalance needs to be remedied.
5. Track Student Academic Success Through a Rigorous Research
Program
Fifth, NCLB should include a targeted research component. The
NCLB transfer program offers an important opportunity to study the
effects of socioeconomic integration on student achievement. The
achievement of students who remain in failing, high-poverty schools
should be tracked against those who transfer to higher-achieving,
middle class schools. Because it is possible that transferring students
come from more highly motivated families than those who stay
behind in failing schools, research should compare students who wish
to transfer to better schools, but are unable to because of space
limitations, with those given the opportunity to move.21 It is also
important to measure the effect of the changing economic
composition on the achievement of students in receiving middle class
schools.
The U.S. Department of Education has already established a
program to look at student achievement outcomes of transfer
students as part of a study known as the National Longitudinal Study
of No Child Left Behind. 22 It would make good sense to break down
the findings by the socioeconomic status of the receiving school
(majority middle class vs. majority low-income) to see whether the
success of places like Wake County, North Carolina, are replicated
elsewhere. NCLB represents a rare opportunity to study the effects
of transferring from low-income to middle class schools, and the
federal government is uniquely positioned to sponsor this type of
research.
D. Housing Policy

While public school choice is an important tool for achieving
socioeconomic school integration, housing policy offers a
120. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request Advances
NCLB Implementation and Pinpoints Competitiveness (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.ed.
gov/news/pressreleases/2006/02/02062006.html.
121. A similar study is being undertaken on the achievement effects of the federal
private school voucher program in Washington, D.C. See V. Dion Haynes, Voucher
Programat Full Capacity, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2005, at B1.

122. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 65, at 17-18 & n.18.
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complementary strategy.
Author David Rusk has persuasively
argued that "[h]ousing policy is school policy.' ' 23 Because roughly
three quarters of American students attend neighborhood public
schools, reducing residential segregation by economic
status will
124
translate into greater socioeconomic school integration.
Over one hundred local communities have adopted inclusionary
zoning laws that require new developments to set aside a certain
125
share of housing stock for low- and moderate-income households.
Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, has a longstanding
policy requiring that "private homebuilders sell or rent 10 percent of
any new development of fifty or more units to eligible households in
the lowest third of the income scale.' ' 126 An additional "5 percent of
the units must be sold to or rented by the county's public housing
authority.' ' 27 Along the same lines, former Senator John Edwards has
discussed using housing vouchers, rather than private school
vouchers, as a way of providing low-income parents "a chance to
move into neighborhoods with better schools."'2 8

III. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL
INTEGRATION

In many jurisdictions, voluntary political strategies for achieving
socioeconomic school integration may need to be supplemented by
legal strategies to nudge communities in the right direction. Ideally,
the legal argument would be made at the federal level-merging the
129
theories of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
with its focus on inequalities related to economic class, 3 ° and Brown
v. Board of Education,3 ' with its focus on integration rather than
school spending. 32 In the 1960s, there was some reason to believe
that de facto economic concentrations might be found
123. David Rusk, Inclusionary Zoning: Opening Up Opportunity Based Housing 3,
(Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.gamaliel.org/DavidRusk/IZ%20articleB.pdf.
124. CENTURY FOUND. TASK FORCE ON THE COMMON SCH., supra note 105, at 21-22;
KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 149.
125. CENTURY FOUND. TASK FORCE ON THE COMMON SCH., supra note 105, at 21-22.
126. Id. at 22.
127. Id.
128. John Edwards, Address at the Center for American Progress, Washington, D.C.:
Restoring the American Dream-Combating Poverty and Building One America 10
(Sept. 19, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7be9245
fe4-9a2b-43c7-a521-5d6ff2e06e03%7d/transcript05O9l9.pdf).
129. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
130. Id. at 4.
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132. Id. at 487.
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unconstitutional, and one federal court, in the case of Hobson v.
Hansen, did so hold.'33 But the problem, of course, is that the U.S.

Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, holding that
there is no fundamental right to education.' And the Court over the
years has curtailed the radical promise of Brown by limiting its reach
to de jure segregation.'35 Instead, legal efforts to spur socioeconomic

integration are likely to be more fruitful at the state level.
A.

State Education Law
In 1977, Justice William Brennan suggested that because a

conservative U.S. Supreme Court had given a cramped reading to
equal protection guarantees, state courts should take up the slack.

He wrote, "State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law."' 36

Litigators have

taken up Justice Brennan's suggestion with particular gusto in the
field of education, for while the U.S. Constitution does not even

mention education, forty-eight of fifty states have provisions in their
constitutions guaranteeing education to the citizens of the state. 37
The legal theory in support of socioeconomic integration is

straightforward. Some twenty-six state courts have interpreted state
constitutions to require that students be provided an "adequate" or

"equal" education and have used the findings to strike down
inequitable and inadequate spending across school district lines. 38

Greater funding, however, is a necessary but insufficient remedy
because even when districts spend equal amounts, large school-based

inequalities remain. As we have seen, part of receiving an adequate
133. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
134. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-19.
135. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); id. at 218-31 (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The central purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race.").
136. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); see also Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State
Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff v. O'Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 351,
353 (1996) (citing Justice Brennan's observations).
137. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. While states do not generally guarantee nutrition,
shelter, or subsistence, all but two guarantee education. James S. Liebman, Three
Strategies for Implementing Brown Anew, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 112, 120-21 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993).
138. Nat'l Access Network, "Equity" and "Adequacy" School Funding Court
Decisions (Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/equityandadequacy
table.pdf.
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education is having access to "resources" provided in mixed-income
schools like positive peer influences, active school parent volunteers,
and high-quality teachers who teach a rigorous curriculum. 13 9 These
nonfinancial resources are more closely tied to academic achievement
than per pupil expenditure, the traditional remedy in adequacy
cases. 4 ° James Coleman argued that
the educational resources available to each child in a school

include

as

an

important

component

the

educational

backgrounds of the other children in the school-and any state
which dictates the school or school district to which each child
goes is unequally distributing those educational resources,
however equally it is distributing financing. 4 '
At the state level, three major cases bear on this important
Sheff v. O'Neill'42 (Hartford); Paynter v. State'4434
(Rochester); and Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State'

question:

(Minneapolis). The results of this litigation have been mixed, with a

legal victory in Connecticut, 145 a loss in New York, 146 and a settlement

in Minnesota. 147 Each case is worth examining for the lessons it may
impart for possible litigation in the other forty-seven states.
1. Victory in Connecticut: Sheffv. O'Neill
Although no state court has yet squarely held that de facto

economic concentrations pose a state constitutional violation, one
major court has come tantalizingly close.

In 1989, plaintiffs in

139. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

140. For the failure of spending initiatives alone to provide genuine equal educational
opportunity, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 77-102.
141. James S. Coleman, Foreword to JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION, at xiv. (1970).

142. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
143. 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003).
144. Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State, No. 95-014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995).
For trial purposes, the court consolidated NAACP v. State with Xiong v. State, No. 98-2816
(Minn. Dist. Ct. 1998). See KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 176; Settlement Agreement at
1, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State, Xiong v. State, Case Nos. 95-014800, 982816 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Settlement Agreement] ("On October 16, 1998, the Court ordered that the actions be
consolidated for purposes of trial only.").
145. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270-71.
146. Paynter,797 N.E.2d at 1231.

147. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 144, at 1; see also DeRolph v. State, 758
N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio 2001) (explaining that NAACP v. State settled). The issue of
poverty concentrations has also been raised in implementation of North Carolina's
adequacy litigation. See Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 610-11, 599
S.E.2d 365, 372 (2004); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 342, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1997).
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Hartford, Connecticut, filed a complaint in Sheff v. O'Neill, arguing
that de facto racial and economic segregation of students in Hartford
and its suburbs violated the Connecticut Constitution. 14 8 Though the
argument was novel-and clearly departed from the insistence of
federal courts that only de jure segregation requires a remedy-in
1996 the plaintiffs prevailed in a state supreme court decision that, if
replicated, could have a revolutionary impact on school desegregation
and education generally. Three justices on the Connecticut Supreme
Court itself agreed that Sheff might have been "the most significant
ruling of this court in this century."149
Sheff was the brainchild of civil rights attorney Jack Boger, who
teamed up with like-minded lawyers John Brittain, Marianne Lado,
Wesley Horton, and others.15 ° The case had at its heart a simple fact:
"Hartford children attend schools that are the most racially,
ethnically, and economically isolated in the state."'' 1 In Hartford,
fully 63% of students were eligible for free and reduced-price meals,
while the subsidized meal rate of fifteen of twenty-one surrounding
suburbs was less than 10%.152 Racially, Hartford public schools were
95% minority, while the suburbs were heavily white.153
In a typical Hartford fifth-grade class of twenty-three students,
Columbia's Gary Natriello testified, a teacher
would have 3 [children] who were born with low birth weights,
3 born to mothers using drugs, and 5 born to teen-age mothers;
15 living below the poverty line, 15 living with single parents,
and 8 living in inadequate housing; 21 members of minority
groups; up to 12 from homes in 15which
English is not spoken,
4
and 9 whose parents do not work.
The contrast to the suburbs could not be more striking.
Journalist James Traub noted that Hartford, one of the ten poorest
cities in America, sits in the middle of the wealthiest state in the

148. See Sheff v. O'Neill (Sheff 1), 609 A.2d 1072, 1074 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992), rev'd,
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
149. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1310 (Borden, J., dissenting).
150. SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4:

AMERICAN EDUCATION ON

TRIAL 84-93 (2006).
151. Plaintiffs' Brief at 1, Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (S.C. 15255) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
152. Id. at 22.
153. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1272-73, 1287.
154. George Judson, In Hartford, Data Portray Schools in Crisis of Poverty, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1993, § 1, at 26 (citing Natriello's testimony).
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country.1 1 5 Achievement in the city was abysmal. 5 6 Over the years,
Hartford had tried everything, including contracting
the Hartford
57
schools out to a private company-but all had failed.
The plaintiffs' case was different than traditional state cases
focusing on spending because it noted that although Hartford already
outspent the surrounding suburbs, money was not enough to produce
equal opportunity.158
In addition, the case was different than
traditional desegregation cases in two respects:
it focused on
economic as well as racial segregation, and it went after de facto
segregation. Then University of Connecticut School of Law professor
John Brittain noted that Sheff involved "a new theory of unequal
educational opportunity due to a high concentration of poor children
in an urban school district."1'59
In addition to making a traditional racial claim, plaintiffs argued6
that concentrations of poverty had a harmful effect on students.'
Brittain declared: " 'The most signal fact about Hartford is not that
it's 92 percent non-white but that it's 63 percent poor.' ",161 Teachers
and administrators in Hartford told the New York Times that while
"[t]he most obvious difference" between Hartford and suburban
schools "is race," in fact "a greater chasm ... is poverty. ' 1 62 While
civil rights groups have focused on race, these teachers said that
"economic isolation is the real root that has made segregated schools
a problem.,

163

155. James Traub, Can Separate Be Equal? New Answers to an Old Question About
Race and Schools, HARPER'S MAG., June 1994, at 36, 40.
156. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273.
157. Rene Sanchez, Hartford Public School PrivatizationDeal Collapses, WASH. POST,
Jan. 25, 1996, at A3.
158. James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 529, 540 (1999).
159. John C Brittain, Educational and Racial Equity Toward the Twenty-First
Century-A Case Experiment in Connecticut,in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY, supra note 137, at 167, 167.
160. See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 151, at 21-24. George Judson, Civil Rights
Lawyers Hope To Use Hartford Schools Case as a Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at
B1 (stating that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund treated Sheff as a
poverty and justice case, not a racial desegregation case).
161. Traub, supra note 155, at 41. Traub argued that "Sheff is about poverty, not race."
Id. at 37.
162. Kirk Johnson, Two Schools, Separatedby Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1989, § 1,
at 29.
163. Id.
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The plaintiffs cited testimony of experts-including Mary
Kennedy, author of congressionally sponsored studies of Chapter 1,"6
William Trent of the University of Illinois, and Gary Orfield of

Harvard-on the harms associated with concentrations of poverty in
a school. Kennedy noted that the achievement of all students is
"lower in high poverty concentration schools"; that they fall

"increasingly behind as they proceed in their education"; and that
"reductions in poverty concentration have been shown to have
positive effects."165 Trent noted that, after controlling for family
socioeconomic status and race, concentrations of poverty in a school
reduce education attainment, occupational attainment, and future
income.166 Plaintiffs also noted that even David Armor, who testified

for the State in defense, "conceded the harmful effect of the
concentration of poverty in the schools."167 Likewise, the State
conceded that "by eliminating concentrations of poverty we should

see improved student achievement."' 68 The lower court, which was
generally hostile to the plaintiffs' case, had also acknowledged that
"the concentration of poverty and at-risk students lead to adverse
1 69
educational outcomes.'
Plaintiffs also cited testimony of teachers that "the concentration
of at-risk children in Hartford's classrooms overwhelms the normal
teaching process.""17 One principal told journalist James Traub, "It's
not like they don't have these problems in the suburbs too. But you
can deal with it if it's isolated."'7 1 High-poverty, predominantly
minority schools offered fewer advanced course offerings and had less

164. See, e.g., M.M. KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., POVERTY,
ACHIEVEMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION SERVICES:
AN INTERIM REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CHAPTER 1 (1986). Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was for a time renamed Chapter 1, but
the Title I designation was subsequently restored. Title I and Chapter 1 are identical. 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2000).
165. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 151, at 23-24.
166. Id. at 24; see also Robert A. Frahm, Students Gain from Desegregation,Sociologist
Testifies, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 30, 1992, at Bi; Interview with Marianne Lado,
former staff attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, current Gen. Counsel to
N.Y. Lawyers for the Pub. Interest, in N.Y., N.Y. (Dec. 12, 1997) (transcript on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
167. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 151, at 23. David J. Armor, Facts and Fictions About
Education in the Sheff Decision, 29 CONN. L. REV. 981, 984 (1997) (acknowledging that
socioeconomic disparities between schools coincide with differences in academic benefit to
students).
168. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 151, at 28.
169. Id. at 44 n.65.
170. Id. at 22 n.44.
171. Traub, supra note 155, at 38 (quoting principal Don Carso).
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experienced and less educated teachers. Hartford had twice as many
first-year teachers as the state average; and a lower proportion of
teachers with master's degrees than any of the surrounding twentyone communities. 172 Student expectations were low; one teacher told
Traub, "And if you talk about college, they'll say, 'What's college? I
don't know anyone who's been to college.' "173 One minority parent
said she was hesitant to send her child to a predominantly white
school, because she didn't want her child exposed to white racism.
However, when she found that her child's ninth-grade class was using
the same text used in the suburbs for a remedial fifth-grade class, she
signed her son up for the transfer program immediately.'7 4
The State of Connecticut, pointing to federal precedents for
guidance, said the State should be held responsible only for de jure
racial segregation, and it prevailed in the lower court.'75 But the
Connecticut Supreme Court, in its pathbreaking 1996 decision, held
that de facto racial segregation of the public schools violates the
Connecticut Constitution. Citing the equal education clause, read in
conjunction with a special clause in the Connecticut Constitution
forbidding racial segregation, the court held that "the existence of
extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system
deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational
opportunity and requires the state to take further remedial
measures."' 17 6 The court chose not to decide the more novel question
of whether economic segregation is unconstitutional but explicitly left
77
open that possibility.
The racial rather than economic focus of the court's decision was
unfortunate for psychological, legal, sociological, and political
reasons. First, the racial focus left the decision open to the attack
from both the left and right that it was condescending to say blacks
need integration to achieve. 78 Second, the emphasis on racial de
facto segregation left the decision vulnerable to legal attack under the
Federal Constitution because some courts have held that basing
student assignment decisions on race in an effort to combat de facto
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 151, at 19.
Traub, supra note 155, at 38 (quoting teacher Delia Bello).
See EATON, supra note 150, at 104.
See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1272 (Conn. 1996).
Id. at 1281.
See id.

178. See Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Chartinga New Course,

106 YALE L.J. 2375, 2380 (1997); Bobbie Roessner & Laurence D. Cohen, Liberal and
Conservative Agree-Sort of-on School Choice, HARTFORD COURANT, July 14, 1996, at
D3.
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racial segregation is itself unconstitutional and impermissible.'7 9
Likewise, the court's invocation of Connecticut's racial segregation
clause, which is highly unusual among state constitutions, had the
unfortunate effect of leading some commentators to incorrectly
conclude that Sheff was not replicable in other states.18 ° Third, the
racial emphasis left the majority open to the dissent's pointed
criticism that the lower court had found academic achievement is not
linked to the racial makeup of a student body but rather to the effects
of poverty, both in the family and in the school.181 An emphasis on
class segregation, by contrast, would have been consistent with both
the findings of the dissent and the thrust of the plaintiffs' argumentas the New York Times noted-that "the heart of the problem" was
economic segregation.1" Fourth, given the unfortunate realities of
racial politics, an economic-based decision might not have carried the
political baggage associated with race that the Sheff case now
carries."'
Although not a direct precedent for the proposition that
economic school segregation violates a state's obligation to provide
equal or adequate education, Sheff s ruling that de facto segregation
by race is unconstitutional is a highly relevant precedent for the
economic segregation argument because it represents a crucial
departure from the federal requirement that segregation be
intentional in order to present a violation. The Sheff court found that
in allowing de facto segregation of the schools, the State failed to
meet its affirmative obligation to provide "a substantially equal

179. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 129 (4th Cir.
1999). Three circuit courts have upheld the use of race in student assignment in cases
involving Louisville, Kentucky; Seattle, Washington; and Lynn, Massachusetts. See supra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text. However, the Supreme Court stepped in to review
those cases, and proponents of race-conscious plans were discouraged at oral argument in
December 2006. Linda Greenhouse, Court Reviews Race as Factor in School Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at Al.
180. This issue is discussed more fully infra at Part III.B, C.
181. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1298, 1304 (Borden, J., dissenting).
182. See Judson, supra note 160. The dissent repeatedly emphasized the fact that the
trial court found no evidence that racial isolation negatively affects the achievement of
minority students. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1298, 1304, 1334 (Borden, J., dissenting). For
Judge Harry Hammer's focus on family poverty and school poverty concentrations, see
Sheff v. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *17, *32, *40
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1995), rev'd, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), and Sheff v. O'Neill,
No. S.C. 15255, 1995 Conn. LEXIS 249, at *30-32 (Conn. June 27, 1995).
183. See Carole Bass, School Face-Off-New Lawsuit: A Whiter Shade of Sheff?, NEw
HAVEN ADVOC., Apr. 30, 1998, http://www.newhavenadvocate.comlarticles/raceschool.
html (last visited Sept. 23, 1998).

2007]

SOCIOECONOMICSCHOOL INTEGRATION

1577

educational opportunity."'' The Connecticut Supreme Court cited
two reasons that the de facto/de jure distinction from federal
constitutional law does not apply under state constitutional lawreasons that parallel the way in which state courts have distinguished
state spending decisions from Rodriguez.
First, whereas the Federal Constitution imposes only a negative
obligation-thou shalt not segregate by law-and contains no
fundamental right to education, 185 Connecticut's state constitution
imposes an affirmative obligation to provide schoolchildren with
"substantially equal educational opportunity," so the State is
responsible for omissions as well as affirmative acts. 86 And second,
where the federal courts were constrained by concerns about
federalism, the Connecticut court noted that this principle does "not
restrict our constitutional authority to enforce" the state
87
constitution.
The step from Sheffis central holding (that de facto racial
segregation is unconstitutional) to a holding that the State must also
remedy de facto economic segregation is a very small one. Indeed, if
equal educational opportunity is the key principle, the economic
composition of a school is more important than its racial composition,
according to a mountain of sociological evidence'--evidence that
1 89
even the Sheff dissenters explicitly acknowledged.
The breakthrough in Sheff, that de facto segregation presents a
constitutional violation, is significant not only on the violation side,
but also in terms of the remedy. A corollary of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision to limit Brown to de jure segregation was its 1974
decision in Milliken v. Bradley to extend desegregation remedies only
to parties guilty of segregation. 19° Since the scope of the remedy can
only reach the extent of the violation, desegregation normally is
limited to a given school district's boundary-which effectively
exempts most suburban school districts from remedies involving
urban school segregation. But when the violation involves de facto
segregation, the Milliken boundary limitation no longer applies.' 91

184. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1280.

185. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1973).
186. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1279.
187. Id.
188. KAHLENBERG, supra note 26, at 4-6 (citing numerous sources).
189. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1313 (Borden, J., dissenting).
190. 418 U.S. 717, 744-46 (1974).
191. Likewise, the hesitation of the Milliken Court to impose a federal interdistrict
remedy on a locality does not apply to state courts which need not be concerned about
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That is the truly revolutionary impact of Sheff. because the violation
involved de facto segregation, Hartford could reach out to the
suburbs in crafting a meaningful remedy. Former NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund ("LDF") attorney Marianne Lado
said Sheff "sends a message that you have to conceive of the people
of a metropolitan area as being in the same boat, and you can't draw
a line around an inner city and say, 'Survive or die on your own.' "I'
The case applied
not only to the Hartford area but to the entire State
93
Connecticut.
of
In addition, the Sheff decision is not subject to the ticking time
bomb that hangs over Brown. The remedy of de facto segregation by
race or class is not tied to an act of wrongdoing which can be cured
through a process of achieving "unitary" status. 194 Because the
violation involves de facto rather than de jure segregation, the
remedy is required as long as de facto segregation exists, and
therefore it will not "expire" in the way Brown remedies have. It is
permanent.
In practice, implementing an adequate remedy in Sheff has
proven difficult. The Connecticut Supreme Court decision called for
the state legislature to devise an appropriate remedy.'95 The plaintiffs
informally suggested an interdistrict remedy in which 25% of
Hartford students would attend suburban schools, and ten magnet
schools would be built in Hartford to attract middle class white
students. 96 Plaintiffs noted that 70% of Connecticut school children
already rode buses to school. 9 7 Instead, Republican Governor John
G. Rowland appointed a twenty-two member Education
Improvement Panel to make recommendations. 9 8 In January 1997,
the panel recommended a series of reforms including public school
choice across district lines and expanded charters and magnet
schools.' 99
issues of federalism. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 97-98 (1995); id. at 131-32
(Thomas, J., concurring).
192. Judson, supra note 160.
193. George Judson, Hartford Court Bars Imbalance in the Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1996, at Al.
194. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968).
195. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
196. Traub, supra note 155, at 47.
197. Eve Nagler, Connecticut Q&A: John C. Brittain; The Color Line and Children's
Education,N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 13, at 3.
198. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Hartford School Integration Panel Formed,N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 1996, at B2.
199. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The
Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CoNN. L. REV.
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In 1997, Connecticut's state legislature enacted a more modest
plan, incorporating some but not all of the panel's ideas: interdistrict
choice, magnets, and financial incentives for integration.2 °° By the
1998-99 school year, more than 800 students in Hartford, New
2 01
Haven, and Bridgeport were attending school in the suburbs.
202
Plaintiffs called the remedy inadequate and returned to court.

In March 1999, Superior Court Judge Julia L. Aurigemma ruled that
the State had done much to alleviate segregation-pointing to the

State's new charter schools (required to reduce racial and economic
isolation), interdistrict magnets, and the statewide public school
choice programs paying districts to accept students from other
districts-and that these remedies should be given time to be
implemented.0 3 Interestingly, although the Connecticut Supreme
Court's decision spoke to race alone, the plaintiffs argued that racial

integration must also involve socioeconomic integration and that the
percentage of students on Aid to Families with Dependent Children

("AFDC") or free lunch "need[s] to be part of the plan" in addition
to the percentage of minority students. °4 More importantly, the
legislation adopted by the State of Connecticut spoke to "racial,
25
ethnic and economic isolation" as did Judge Aurigemma's decision.
This development is intriguing, since a federal challenge to the use of
20 6
race in assignment would leave the economic provisions standing.
1115, 1173-74 (1997) (citing EDUC. IMPROVEMENT PANEL, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR

(1997)).
200. See Act of June 26, 1997, Pub. Act No. 97-290, 1997 Conn. Acts 1113, 1114, 111718 (Reg. Sess.); Jeff Archer, New Chapters Written in Saga of Conn. Desegregation Case,
EDUC. WK., June 11, 1997, at 17; CriticsSay It Falls Short: FirstSteps To Meet Sheff Order
Will Significantly Impact Schools, Local Govts., CONN. TOWN & CITY, July-Aug. 1997, at
7; Jeff Archer, State Policy Update: Connecticut, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB, Jan. 8, 1998,
http://counts.edweek.org/sreports/qc98/states/ct-s.htm (part of the Quality Counts '98
Special Report); Fred Musante, Remedies Elusive in Sheff Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997,
§ 13, at 1.
201. Richard Weizel, School Busing, City and Suburban,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 13,
at 17.
202. Musante, supra note 200.
203. See Sheff v. O'Neill (Sheff If), 733 A.2d 925, 943 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Jeff
Archer, CourtSides with Conn. in Latest Sheff Ruling, EDUC. WK., Mar. 10, 1999, at 14.
204. See Interview with Marianne Lado, supra note 166, at 51.
205. See Sheff I1,733 A.2d at 927 (noting language of Public Act 97-290 that the
"educational interests of the state" were amended to include the reduction of "racial,
ethnic and economic isolation"); see also id. at 925 (characterizing the supreme court's
decision in Sheff as holding that "racially, ethnically and economically isolated" schools
were unconstitutional); id at 926 (emphasizing "the importance of remedying racial, ethnic
and economic segregation in the schools").
206. Judge Aurigemma specifically noted that the use of racial quotas was probably
unconstitutional under federal law. Id. at 930.
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Plaintiffs preferred a plan put together by the Connecticut
Center for School Change, a nonprofit group that proposed
consolidating Hartford and twenty-one surrounding districts into one
district.2 7 The plan, called "The Unexamined Remedy," was floated
in the summer of 1998.208 Where Hartford's 23,791 students were

overwhelmingly poor and 95% minority, the new unified district
would consist of nearly 100,000 students, 62% white, 19% black, and

16% Hispanic, with subsidized meal rates ranging from 35% in the
elementary schools to 17% in the high schools. 20 9 The backers argued

for using "controlled choice" within the new district, pointing to
Cambridge as an example, with all schools to fall within a 15% plus or
minus range of the new district's ethnic balance. 21" The plan noted
that the twenty-two communities were already part of a recognized

"Hartford region" under legislation passed by the General Assembly,
and that several districts in the South already are operating countysized districts of the size contemplated by the merger.211 Proponents

of cross-district integration had long noted that many white, middle
class schools are within one to two miles of the urban schools,212 and
polling found that Connecticut residents actually provided narrow
support for the Sheff ruling, 47% to 41%.213
In January 2003, litigants reached a temporary settlement in the

remedy phase of the case. At that time 10% of Hartford students
attended "integrated

2 14

schools through various programs.1 5

The

settlement called for a $45 million program to raise that share to 30%
207. See Gordon A. Bruno & Kathryn A. McDermott, Foreword to CONN. CTR. FOR
SCH. CHANGE, THE UNEXAMINED REMEDY:
A FIRST DRAFT OF A PLAN To
CONSOLIDATE THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF HARTFORD AND 21 NEIGHBORING TOWNS
INTO A HIGH QUALITY, RACIALLY INTEGRATED SCHOOL SYSTEM 3-4 (1998).

208. Id.
209. CONN. CTR. FOR SCH. CHANGE, supra note 207, at 24-26.
210. Id. at 14-18.
211. Bruno & McDermott, supra note 207, at 4; see also Jeff Archer, Plan Would Join
Hartford with Surrounding Districts, EDUC. WK., July 8, 1998, at 8, available at
http://www.teachermag.com/ew/vol-17/42hart.h17.
212. Johnson, supra note 162 (noting short distances).
213. Robert A. Frahm, Residents As Divided As Court on Sheff: Courant-ISI
ConnecticutPoll, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 16, 1996, at Al.
214. The settlement defined a school as integrated if a school is not thirty percentage
points above the minority student average in Hartford and the surrounding twenty-one
communities. KAHLENBERG, supra note 116, at 34. In 2005-06, the minority percentage
was 43%, so a school at or below 73% minority is considered integrated. See Stan
Simpson, A Decade of Half Measures: 10 Years After a Hartford Mother and Son Forced
City Schools To Integrate, Progress Has Dragged, HARTFORD COURANT, July 23, 2006, at
NE4 (Magazine), availableat http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/documents/education/htfd
courant__072306.asp.
215. Kahlenberg, supra note 116, at 31.
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by 2007.216 The plan called for a doubling of the Open Choice
programs, enabling 1,600 Hartford students to attend urban schools,
and the construction of eight new magnet schools "accommodating
600 students each. ' 217 The agreement provided that the settlement
would expire in 2007, at which point plaintiffs could push for
integration beyond the 30% goal.218 In August 2004, however,
plaintiffs were back in court alleging that the State had failed to meet
benchmarks in the January 2003 settlement. 219 In 2006, estimates
stated that between 14% and 23.5% of Hartford students were
attending integrated schools.22 ° With the settlement due to expire in
the summer of 2007, plaintiffs called for more aggressive action.221
2. A Loss in New York: Paynter v. State
In 1998, plaintiffs filed a Sheff-like case in Rochester, New York,
directly challenging poverty concentrations and minority isolation in
the city's schools as a denial of the right-articulated in Campaignfor
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State222 ("CFE")-to a "sound basic
education. ' 223 In Paynter v. State,22 4 attorneys sued the State-on
behalf of fifteen African-American schoolchildren-for drawing
boundaries that resulted in high concentrations of school poverty.225
The suit proposed that the New York State Education Commissioner
" 'be required to develop a plan to ameliorate the effects of the
concentration of poverty.' ",226 Noting the association between race
and poverty, the complaint also included a charge that student
assignments violate the disparate impact provisions of Title VI of the

216. Id. at 34.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 31-34.
219. EATON, supra note 150, at 334-35.
220. See Simpson, supra note 214 (citing Trinity College professor Jack Dougherty's
estimate that 14% of Hartford students are in integrated schools, in contrast to the State
of Connecticut's estimate of 23.5%).
221. Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Backers Want Progress, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 28,

2007, at B4, available at http://www.courant.com/news/education/hc-sheffol28.artjan28,0,6
674491.story (noting that organizers have called for a lobbying effort to "step up progress
towards the goals" of the settlement).
222. 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
223. Id. at 664.
224. 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003).
225. Id. at 1227.
226. See Mary Ann Zehr, Rochester Students File Class Action Against New York,
EDUC. WK., Oct. 14, 1998, at 17 (quoting Bryan Hetherington, attorney for the plaintiffs in
Paynter).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.227 But the primary, and more novel, thrust
of the lawsuit was its socioeconomic emphasis. As local columnist
Mark Hare noted, "[I]s easing the racial isolation
the right goal? Not
228
any more. The real issue today is poverty.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs built their case around two
central arguments. First, they argued the Rochester schools were not
providing a "sound basic education," pointing to wide disparities in
outcomes between Rochester and its suburban neighbors in Monroe
County, New York, on a number of variables. 229 The dropout rate
was five times higher in Rochester than in surrounding suburbs (7.0%
vs. 1.4%); the retention rate (percentage of freshman class that
graduates) was more than three times higher in suburban schools than
in Rochester (84% vs. 27%), and the percentage of ninth-graders
going on to college in four years was five times higher in the
suburbs.23 On New York Regents Examinations, Rochester passage
rates were typically four times lower than in the suburbs, and the
percentage of Regents diplomas conferred in suburban schools
231
surrounding Rochester was ten times greater than in the city itself.
23 2
These results were, they suggested, "by any standard, inadequate.,
Second, the plaintiffs argued the inadequate outcomes were "due
'23 3
in large part, to the widely disparate concentration of poverty.
Noting that poverty concentrations were extreme in Rochester-the
district had a 90% subsidized meal rate compared with a 16% rate in
surrounding suburbs, a five-fold difference-they argued that poverty
concentrations were harmful to academic achievement.234 They
cited, 235 among other things, the congressionally mandated study of
Chapter 1 which found that "[s]chool poverty depresses the scores of
all students in schools where at least half of the students are eligible
227. Class Action Complaint at 2, Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003) (No.
99-724) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Paynter Complaint].
This complaint is the original complaint filed by the plaintiffs in Paynter against the State
of New York. The plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint to add neighboring school
districts as defendants in response to an order by the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department that local Monroe County school districts were
necessary parties to the suit. See Paynter v. State, 704 N.Y.S.2d 763, 763-64 (App. Div.
2000).
228. See Mark Hare, Is Racial Isolation the Key Problem in City Schools?, ROCHESTER
DEMOCRAT& CHRON., Nov. 15, 1998, at BI.

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Paynter Complaint, supra note 227, at 1, 19.
Id. at 22-23, 29.
Id. at 24-26.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Paynter Complaint, supra note 227, at 31
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for subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when more
than 75 percent of students live in low-income households., 236 The
plaintiffs noted that the same study found poor students in low237
poverty schools "performed significantly better.
The plaintiffs argued that high-poverty schools provide negative
learning environments for a number of reasons. For one thing, "[t]he
concentration of at-risk children in schools and classrooms
overwhelms the normal teaching process. ' 238 To receive a sound
basic education, plaintiffs contended, requires "a core group of
middle class students and parents in the schools." 9 For another, they
cited a 1998 New York State Education Department study noting that
"high-poverty schools tended to have less funding and teachers with
less impressive credentials. 24 ° By identifying the class as "all children
in the Rochester City School District who must attend" high-poverty
schools, they emphasized that whether a student is from a middle
class or poor family, attending a high-poverty school is a
disadvantage.241
Plaintiffs noted that the assignment of students was not based on
laws of nature and that the concentrations were rather the result of
the State's "system of school residency requirements. '24 2 All fifteen
plaintiffs lived in the City of Rochester.243 If plaintiffs wanted to
attend suburban schools, they would have to pay nonresident tuition
under state law. 2 " Finally, they argued for a remedy that addressed
these concentrations directly. Plaintiffs called not for extra funding
but for an injunction in which Rochester students were provided
education in an environment "not marked by high concentrations of

poverty. "245
Unlike the plaintiffs in Sheff, the plaintiffs in Paynter never had a
chance to argue their case on the merits in court. In June 2003, the
state's highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, in a five-to-one
decision, affirmed a motion to dismiss the claim without letting it go
to trial, saying the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the state

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

PUMA ET AL., supra note 23, at 12.

Paynter Complaint, supra note 227, at 32.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 2-4.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.
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constitution's education article.24 6 The court held that the State could
not be held responsible for the demographic makeup of school
districts because doing so "would mean either making it responsible
for where people choose to live, or holding that it must periodically
redraw school district lines, negating the preferences of the
residents."2 47 The court also worried about diminishing "local control
24 8
and participation.
Judge George Bundy Smith wrote a lengthy dissent in the case. 49
Judge Smith argued the education article was not limited to providing
adequate financial resources.
If the concentration of poor and
minority students "will necessarily result in schools that do not offer
the opportunity of a sound basic education, even with adequate
funding, then the State should remedy that problem."' '
He also
rejected the majority's argument about local control, noting that
"[t]he Constitution does not place the responsibility of providing a
sound education on local school districts, or towns, or cities. It places
that responsibility squarely on the State. 252 He argued that "[t]here
is nothing sacrosanct about district lines," noting the decline in New
York state from 11,000 school districts in 1894 to 700 in modern
times.25 3 He could have noted, but did not, that for low-income
parents, the court's emphasis on respecting parents "preferences"
regarding where to live neglected the fact that not everyone can
"choose" to live in a middle class neighborhood with good public
schools.
On the very same day that the court handed down its decision in
Paynter,it ruled in favor of plaintiffs seeking adequacy of resources in
CFE. The decision in CFE was rightly hailed as a great victory for
low-income children, but the decision in Payntersuggested New York
would follow in the path of much of the rest of the country: trying to
make "separate but equal" work as well as possible.
3. A Settlement in Minnesota: NAACP v. State
In 1995, lawyers for the LDF in Minneapolis filed suit
challenging de facto economic and racial segregation of Minneapolis

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id. at 1231 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
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schools and the surrounding suburbs as a violation of the State's
duty-as recognized in Skeen v. State 5 4-to provide an adequate
education. 5 Plaintiffs argued that de facto "racial and economic"

segregation violated the state constitution's equal protection and
education clauses 256 and sought a remedy integrating Minneapolis
schools with those in surrounding suburbs.5 7 While Minneapolis
schools had been under desegregation orders since 1972, the federal
Likewise, while
decision did not reach suburban schools. 8

Minnesota has one of the nation's most liberal interdistrict transfer
laws, jurisdictions are permitted to exclude out-of-district pupils for
reasons of space, and students need to pay their own transportation
costs.

259

As a result, Minneapolis schools became increasingly populated
by students of color and students who were poor. By 1997-98,
plaintiffs noted, 68% of Minneapolis students were students of color
and 66% were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, compared with
a statewide population that is 14% minority and 26% eligible for
In suburbs of Edina and Minnetonka, the
subsidized meals.2 6
minority population was 5% and the free and reduced-meal rate
3%.261
The plaintiffs argued that a "racially and socioeconomically

integrated environment" is one component of a "constitutionally
254. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
255. Class Action Complaint at 2, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State, No. 95014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1995) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter NAACP Complaint]; See john powell, Segregation and Educational
Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB.L. & POL'Y 337, 381-84
(citing Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313, 315).
256. NAACP Complaint, supra note 255, at 1.
257. Id. at 1-2. For discussions of the Minneapolis case, see Duchesne Paul Drew,
Minneapolis NAACP Sues State, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 20, 1995, at 1A; Anne
O'Connor, Issue of Desegregation Reaches Far Beyond Walls of Classroom, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), May 15, 1998, at A19; Joanna Richardson, Suit Seeks Minn. Backing of
DesegregationPlan, EDUC. WK., Oct. 4, 1995, at 12.
258. See powell, supra note 255, at 381-82 (discussing the minimal impact of Booker v.
Special School District No. 1, 359 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972), on desegregation in
Minneapolis). As in most school desegregation cases, the Minneapolis case was limited to
Minneapolis schools, because the at-fault party was the school district-not the State.
259. See Interdistrict Desegregation or Integration Transportation Aid, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 124D.87 (West 2000).
260. NAACP v. State and Xiong v. State Settlement Proposal at 2-3, Feb. 19, 1999 (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Minnesota Settlement Proposal];
see also powell, supra note 255, at 387-88 (providing a statistical breakdown of segregation
in Minneapolis).
261. Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories at 2, NAACP v. State, No. 95014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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adequate education. 2 62 In support of this notion, the NAACP
pointed to state data showing that in 1998, "[l]ow income students
who attend suburban schools [were] also twice as likely to have high
achievement levels as low-income students attending school in
Minneapolis. 2 63 The plaintiffs further cited extensive national data
suggesting that the achievement gap between whites and students of
color decreases and the performance, graduation rates, chances of life
success, and participation in social and economic life of students of
color all improve in desegregated schools. 26
The plaintiffs argued that race and class have independent
effects, with class being the primary of the two. In the companion
case of Xiong v. State,265 filed in 1998, the plaintiffs stated in their
complaint: "Concentrated poverty, as exists in parts of the City of
Minneapolis, when carried into the public schools, directly results in
lower student achievement, wholly without regard to considerations
of race. Racial segregation, on top of socioeconomic segregation,
further exacerbates these problems and worsens educational
outcomes., 266 In April 1998, the plaintiffs publicized a document
indicating that school officials knew that a plan for "community
schools"-more resources for segregated schools-would not work,
citing a San Francisco study finding that disadvantaged students do
better when attending middle class schools with fewer resources than
when attending high-poverty schools with more.267
In March 2000, the parties settled the suit, reaching an agreement
on a four-year experiment beginning in the fall of 2001 to encourage
greater socioeconomic integration of schools in a number of ways.2 8
262. Minnesota Settlement Proposal, supra note 260, at 1.
263. John G. Shulman & Jeanne-Marie Almonor, State Admits That Integration
Improves Student Achievement 2 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished report prepared for
mediation, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

264. John G. Shulman & Jeanne-Marie Almonor, The Truth About Desegregation,
Segregation, and "Community" Schools 1-4 (Sept. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); see also powell, supra note 255, at 386, 390-91, 39799; Interview with john a. powell, Professor of Law, formerly at the Univ. of Minn. Law
Sch. and currently at Ohio State Univ., Moritz Coll. of Law, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec.
19, 1997) (transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
265. No. 98-2816 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1998).
266. Class Action Complaint at 11, Xiong v. State, No. 98-2816 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb.
23, 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
267. Press Release, Shulman, Walcott & Shulman, P.A., Minneapolis and Suburban
School Officials Conspire To Provide Inadequate, Segregated "Community Schools"
(Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (referencing minutes of
April 29, 1993, meeting of school officials); see also D. Eric Harmon, Smoking Gun?
INSIGHT, May 4,1998, at 1.

268. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 144, exhibit B.
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Building on the state's interdistrict transfer law, the State agreed to
make transportation available for low-income students (up to $500
per year) to attend suburban schools. 26 9 Eight suburbs agreed to set
aside a total of at least 500 seats for low-income city students each
year.27 ° Within Minneapolis, magnet schools that were wealthier than
the city average were required to set aside up to 20% of kindergarten
seats for low-income students and up to 50% of seats that open up in
grades one through five.2 1 The agreement came on top of an earlier
commitment from the state legislature to build a K-12 Minneapolis
magnet school to draw from eight surrounding suburban districts and
an interdistrict school in suburban Roseville, open to students from
North St. Paul and St. Paul.272
The program, though small, has been seen as a success. The
Choice Is Yours program, which grew out of the settlement, has
allowed 2,000 low-income Minneapolis students to attend suburban
schools over a four-year period.27 3 An evaluation report prepared for
the Minnesota Department of Education by ASPEN Associates
concluded that "suburban choice students made significantly greater
gains in reading than the comparable non-participants," with annual
gains translating into reading scores that averaged twenty-three
percentile points higher than gains of nonparticipants.27 4 The gains
for math translated into a twenty-five percentile point advantage.275
Recently, the legislature voted to continue the program even after the
four-year settlement expired.276
B.

Replication of Sheff Through Education Law in Other States

The ruling in Sheff and the settlement in NAACP and Xiong
hold great potential for replication in other states. Although some
269. Press Release, Carol R. Johnson, Superintendent, Minneapolis Public Schools,
Commentary on the Recent NAACP vs. State of Minnesota Settlement Agreement (Mar.
22, 2000), http://www3.mpls.kl2.mn.us/news/news-release/naacp4.shtml.
270. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 144, exhibit B; Norman Draper, Schools
Group OKs NAACP Settlement, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 24, 2000, at B1.
271. Johnson, supra note 269.
272. Ann Bradley, Minnesota: State Test Results Highlight Once-Hidden Performance
Gaps in Urban Districts and Light a Smoldering Fuse, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB, Jan. 8,
1998, http://counts.edweek.org/sreports/qc98/states/mn-n.htm. (part of the Quality Counts
'98 Special Report).
273. ASPEN ASSOCIATES, MINNESOTA VOLUNTARY PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 20052006: EVALUATION REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://education.state.mn.us/mde/
groups/Communications/documents/Report/030720.pdf.
274. Id. at 37.
275. Id. at 38.
276. See ASPEN ASSOCIATES, supranote 273, at 1.
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commentators dismissed the relevance of Sheff, given its partial
reliance on Connecticut's unusual antisegregation clause, the logic of
Sheff rests primarily on the equal educational opportunity principle
first used by the state supreme court in finding a constitutional right
to more equitable spending. 7 As the University of Virginia's James
Ryan notes, the Sheff majority cited Connecticut's antisegregation
provision because it could, not because it needed to.27 8 The reference
to the segregation clause may have largely been a political attempt to
avoid the appearance of relying on social science evidence about the
effects of segregation. 279 But logically, the affirmative right to an
equitable or adequate education is all that was necessary to support
the decision. 8 °
A similar right to equity or adequacy across school district lines
has been found in twenty-five other states, where spending inequities
have been held to violate state constitutions.281 In all of the school
financing cases, courts were willing to dismiss the arguments that
spending patterns were a form of de facto discrimination (since
economic inequity is not of the State's making).282 They set aside
local autonomy arguments and placed the responsibility for providing
equal and/or adequate education on the State itself.283 These are
crucial precedents, rebutting arguments against a Sheff-like case
attacking concentrations of poverty.
On the remedy side, ordering a degree of economic integration
is, of course, more complicated than ordering a shifting of finances, so
it cannot be assumed that courts will follow a natural progression
from equal spending to economically balanced schools. One of the
major limiting principles of judicial power requires that the remedy
involve clearly administrable judicial standards. But it is important to
note that many states have already moved beyond equity in finance in
recent years to require "adequacy" in education-providing the
education necessary to assure that students will achieve a minimum
277. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977).
278. Ryan, supra note 158, at 549-50.
279. Id. at 550.
280. Id. at 546-54.
281. Nat'l Access Network, supra note 138.
282. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1254 (Cal. 1971) (disagreeing with the
contention that a public school financing system involved, at most, de facto
discrimination).
283. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997) ("The responsibility
for maintaining a thorough and efficient school system falls upon the state. When a
district falls short of the constitutional requirement that the system be thorough and
efficient, it is the state's obligation to rectify it.").
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passing level of competency. The new adequacy cases-which have
prevailed in twenty states since 1989 2 -already involve more judicial
intervention than equity cases for three reasons.
First, as William Clune notes, where the old equity cases looked
at inputs, mostly in terms of financial resources, the adequacy theory
seeks a minimally adequate output, in terms of academic
achievement.285 Whereas equity is indifferent to how money is spent,
adequacy requires that it be spent in a way to produce achievement.
In a leading case from Kentucky, Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc.,286 the state supreme court held, in very specific and
substantive terms, that the constitution required that each child must
be provided with
at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in a
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the student
to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state,
and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his
or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in
the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural
and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as
to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts
in surrounding states, in academics or in
27
the job market.
In Abbott v. Burke,288 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the legal requirement was not "a constitutional mandate governing
expenditures per pupil, equal or otherwise, but a requirement of a

284. Nat'l Access Network, supra note 138. The twenty states in which plaintiffs
prevailed are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id.
285. William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U.

MICH. J.L. REFORM 481,485 (1995).
286. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
287. Id. at 212.
.288. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
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specific substantive level of education."289
In these cases, courts have
already gotten into the messy substance of education.
Second, where equity required symmetry of spending, adequacy
may often recognize that poorer districts require more resources, so
judges must enter the complicated educational debate over how much
more must be spent on the poor to bring them to an adequate level of
education.2 9° Third, adequacy cases set a minimum threshold,
preventing states from leveling down to an equality that leaves all
districts with inadequate levels of spending.29' Again, this safeguard
requires that courts make determinations about the level of
expenditure required to produce a substantive level of education.
Because adequacy looks at the substance of education-not mere
spending-it has paved the way nicely for the socioeconomic
integration argument. The fact that courts have been willing to get
into the nitty gritty of what is required for an adequate educationbeyond simple rules about equity in spending-suggests that
socioeconomic integration does not represent a new remedial
frontier.
In at least one important respect, socioeconomic integration is
more modest than what some state supreme courts have already
required in adequacy cases. In Abbott, the New Jersey court
questioned to what extent a thorough and efficient education requires
the schools "to account for and attempt to remedy the problems

students bring with them to the schools[:] ... problems created not by

the schools but by society."2" Answering its own question, the court
found that providing a "thorough and efficient" education for poorer
students demands that schools recognize that the needs of those
students exceed those of more affluent students.2 93 Socioeconomic
integration does not compensate for poverty per se; it simply ensures
that in assigning students to schools, the State does not compound the

289. Id. at 368.
290. Clune, supra note 285, at 481-82, 488; see also R. Craig Wood, Adequacy Issues in
Recent Education Finance Litigation, in DEVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL FINANCE: FISCAL
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE ANNUAL NCES STATE DATA CONFERENCE, JULY 28-30,

1993, at 27, 31, 35 (William J. Fowler, Jr. ed., 1995), available at http://eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/contentstorage_01/0000000b/80/24cc162.pdf (concluding that
"courts will arbitrate the distribution of scarce resources and define adequacy for
society").
291. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 290, at 32 (discussing how the formula intended to
achieve an equal distribution of state education funds can result in "an equality of
poverty").
292. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 375.
293. Id.
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problems of the poor by concentrating them in certain schools, the
effect of which is to make education more difficult.
C. Replication of Sheff Through Housing Law
In addition to education spending cases, a number of state courts
have interpreted state constitutions to require affirmative remedies of
de facto economic segregation in the related field of housing. 94
States have struck down zoning laws that have the effect of excluding
the poor, and have required municipalities to provide their fair share
of low- and moderate-income housing. Since courts are generally
more reluctant to interfere with housing than education, the housing
decisions provide important precedents in the drive for economic
school integration.
The leading case in this area is the New Jersey Supreme Court's
1975 decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel.29 5 There, the court unanimously held that zoning laws
which have the effect of excluding poor people violate the New Jersey
Constitution, and that localities have an affirmative obligation to
provide their "fair share" of moderate- and low-income housing. 296 A
municipality could, of course, zone areas for residential, commercial,
single and multifamily units within its boundaries, but it could not
2 97
exclude housing for low- and moderate-income people altogether.
Communities would not be required to take in enormous numbers of
low-income families-the purpose of the zoning laws was "to create
pleasant, well-balanced communities, not to recreate slums in new
locations"-but communities were required to take their fair share of
low-income housing projects.29 8 Significantly, Mount Laurel, which
has been called "the Roe v. Wade of fair housing, the Brown v. Board
of Education of exclusionary zoning, '"299 surmounted the two
obstacles faced by federal constitutional claims involving school
desegregation: the requirement that segregation involve race and
that it be state sponsored.
First, the case reached beyond race to class. Though the
plaintiffs originally brought the case against Mount Laurel for
excluding "black and Hispanic" poor people, the New Jersey
294. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
295. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).

296. Id. at 733.
297. Id. at 731-33.
298. Id. at 745.
299. DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN:
SUBURBIA 3 (1995).
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Supreme Court chose to take on the larger issue of economic class
and framed the case "from the wider viewpoint," that the zoning
policies which banned trailer homes and limited multi-bedroom
apartments excluded families of all races who had modest "income
and resources." 3" Second, Mount Laurel held that there was no
requirement that the zoning policies intentionally exclude poor
people; if the effect was exclusion, that effect was sufficient to trigger
higher judicial scrutiny.3 1 The remedy-like the remedy in Sheffobliterates district lines and says there are wider community
3 2
obligations that transcend narrow political jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the implications of the decision are permanent, not
temporary. °3
If New Jersey was willing to find a constitutional violation
involving de facto economic segregation in housing, it is surely ripe
for an argument involving de facto economic segregation of schools.
Courts have generally subjected state action involving schools to
closer scrutiny than state action involving such interests as housing
and nutrition. °4 Mount Laurel, as Harvard law professor Charles
Haar noted, was "more ambitious" than Brown since it "regulates the
use of the very space where humans must live not just where they
may go to school."3 5 Applying Mount Laurel to economic school
integration is, in some senses, a more modest application of the
housing precedent. Indeed, the Mount Laurel court took some pains
to tie housing to education, noting that one reason municipalities use
exclusive zoning is to keep out poor families who would raise the cost
of education but contribute little to the tax base.30 6 On the education
spending side, New Jersey's Abbott case is among the leading
decisions holding that a state constitution's provision for education
requires more equitable per pupil expenditures. 30 7 A plaintiff
300. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 717; see also CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER
RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 23 (1996) (explaining Justice Hall's
desire to "set a broader precedent" by avoiding the issue of race).
301. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 725 n.10; see also HAAR, supra note 300, at 24-25
(stating Justice Hall's contention that discriminatory impact, rather than intent, was the
relevant factor).
302. See Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 723, 727 (stating that a local jurisdiction may not
act "solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect build[] a wall around
itself," and instead must consider "values which transcend municipal lines").
303. See HAAR, supra note 300, at 46.
304. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (refusing to recognize a
constitutional right to adequate housing).
305. HAAR, supra note 300, at 10.
306. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 723, 729.
307. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359,408 (N.J. 1990).
SIEGE:
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merging the theories of Mount Laurel and Abbott to argue for

economic desegregation of schools might well prevail in New Jersey.
A number of other states have followed Mount Laurel in looking at

economic desegregation of housing, including New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, New York, California, Washington, Massachusetts, and
Michigan.3 °8
Mount Laurel, like Sheff, proved somewhat disappointing in the
remedy phase, so some courts have dismissed its ultimate
significance.3 9 But while the Mount Laurel decision has not reached
its full potential, it had, by the mid-1990s, provided an estimated

250,000 low-income people with access to suburban jobs, schools, and
quality of life.310

CONCLUSION

After years of trying to make "separate but equal" schools for
rich and poor work, a small but growing number of districts are
pursuing conscious strategies of socioeconomic school integration.31 1
These forty districts across the United States could be joined by many
others if NCLB is modified to allow greater use of transfers to
encourage integration across district lines, and if the U.S. Supreme
Court curtails the ability of districts to use race in student assignment,
prompting districts to use income as a race-neutral alternative.
Ultimately, though, state courts may play an important role in
this debate. Some twenty-six state constitutions have been read to
require an equal educational opportunity or an "adequate"
education.312 These victories are important but also limited because

308. See Brian W. Blaeser et al., Advocating Affordable Housing in New Hampshire:
The Amicus CuriaeBrief of the American PlanningAssociation in Wayne Britton v. Town
of Chester, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 23-28 (1991).
309. See, e.g., Britton v. Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 497 (N.H. 1991) (declining to adopt the
Mount Laurel remedy rule); Heritage Bldg. Group, Inc. v. Plumstead Twp. Bd. of
Supervisors, 833 A.2d 1205, 1212 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (declining to follow broad
expansion of zoning methods provided in Mount Laurel).
310. See Nancy Waring, Putting a Stop to Exclusionary Zoning, HARVARD L. BULL.,
Summer 1996, at 31, 32 (an interview with Charles Haar). Between 1975 and 1986,
twenty-two Mount Laurel suits were settled. HAAR, supra note 300, at 89. Haar notes
that 15,400 units were built in New Jersey suburbs which would not have been built but for
the court decision; and between 1987 and 1992, 54,000 additional low- and moderateincome units were permissible under zoning revisions compelled by Mount Laurel. Id. at
131; see also Blaeser et al., supra note 308, at 24 (citing a 1989 Rutgers Law Review study
that Mount Laurel has worked well, and that between 1983 and 1988, 22,000 affordable
housing units were built or planned as a result of the decision).
311. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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they do not bring full equality of educational opportunity. The next
frontier is to extend adequacy to address the fountainhead of
educational inequality in the United States: the separation of income
and more affluent students. A meaningful solution requires a statebased legal strategy that combines the best elements of Brown v.
Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriguez: in raising the educational achievement of students,
integration matters more than per pupil expenditure, and economic
class matters more than race.
The Sheff case remains an important model, the closest America
has come to recognizing the ideal of the "common school," where
children of all backgrounds come together and learn on an equal
footing. Although the remedy has thus far proved disappointing,
even in victory, the lesson of the great litigation for equal
opportunity-from Brown v. Board of Education to Abbott v.

Burke-is that while it may take decades to enforce good decisions,
they can in the long run improve the opportunity of millions of
American schoolchildren in significant, if imperfect, ways.

